




Fear of globalisation and of deindustrialisation tends
to raise demands for industrial policy intervention.
Industrial policy today operates within a globalisation
process which involves greater competition world-
wide, and which calls for significant restructuring of
production. These considerations add to the tradi-
tional arguments for industrial policy intervention
based on aid and protection for strategic industries in
terms of national security or independence. What role
should industrial policy have in the face of globalisa-
tion? Is the traditional sector-based policy dead?
Must EU industry be defended? Some European
countries, led by France, believe that the answer to the
last question is “yes”. This follows the tradition to
foster and protect national champions. We have had
some recent examples with the French government
enforcing alternative “national”solutions by blocking
the merger of Aventis and Novartis and of Suez and
Enel. State aid has also come to the rescue of firms
such as Alstom or Bull or sectors like shipbuilding in
the past.
This chapter discusses a number of issues related to
industrial policy in the EU. To begin, it is necessary to
ask: “What is industrial policy?” The concept is so
flexible that it can cover anything from corporate
action to regional development plans and there is no
consensus on a precise definition. According to a def-
inition given by the US International Trade Commis-
sion, industrial policy involves “coordinated govern-
ment action aimed at directing production resources
to domestic producers in certain industries to help
them become more competitive”.1 This gives a clear
focus to sector-specific policies. However, the Lisbon
Agenda of the EU states that “The main role of in-
dustrial policy at EU level is to proactively provide the
right framework conditions for enterprise develop-
ment and innovation in order to make the EU an
attractive place for industrial investment and job cre-
ation, taking account of the fact that most businesses
are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).”2
This makes no mention of sector-specific policies,
though it does allow for policies to create conditions
for innovation and development.
These differences in definition reflect underlying
views as to the appropriate nature of industrial policy.
We prefer the broad definition that industrial policy is
the set of government actions affecting companies in
different productive sectors in a country (including
service companies) and, more specifically, affecting
their ability to compete both domestically and
abroad. This broad interpretation of industrial policy
would therefore include microeconomic policies
(antitrust, innovation and internationalisation), the
provision of broad infrastructures (transport, com-
munications, education, science and research) and
sector-based aid to companies. In a narrow sense,
industrial policy refers to the sector measures directly
aimed at companies and industries.
Industrial policy forms part of government economic
policy, and its goal should be to maximize the welfare
of citizens. In developed economies open to the world
market, this goal is closely linked to the competitive-
ness of companies and overall productivity of the
economy. The competitiveness of an economy refers to
the ability of its companies to compete in the interna-
tional market. A company will have a competitive
edge over rival companies if it can produce the same
products at a lower cost or better products at the same
cost, that is if it has the edge in terms of cost or
demand (product quality and variety).3 Obviously,
other policies like monetary and exchange rate policy,
fiscal policy, incomes policies or labour market
reforms also affect the competitiveness of firms, but
we do not include them under the definition of indus-
trial policy.
Industrial policy has evolved over the course of the
post-war era. The 1960s and 1970s were marked by
the fostering of national champions, indicative plan-
ning, and state-owned firms with the objective of nar-
1 See Ch. 2 in Tyson (1992).
2 European Commission (2007).
3 A distinction needs to be made between competitiveness and com-
petition. Competition refers to the level of rivalry between compa-
nies operating in a market.rowing the technological gap with US and Japan. This
was also the period of trying to “pick winners” by
selecting industries that were forecasted to be success-
ful or that had such potential if appropriate help was
given (those industries also typically had important
externalities for the rest of the economy).4
In the 1980s scepticism grew about this approach
and there was a move, led by the UK in Europe,
towards privatisation, the introduction of competi-
tion and horizontal measures, common across
industries (and mostly focusing on developing the
science base and innovation). This tendency contin-
ued in the 1990s with an emphasis on technology in
the Framework Programmes and the ESPRIT Prog-
ramme. The recent Lisbon Agenda, aiming to make
the EU the most technologically dynamic and inno-
vation-driven region in the world, is formulated
along similar lines.
However, the globalisation process and the emergence
of international players like China and India have
revived proposals for targeted industry aid and the
“champions” approach. France has been at the fore-
front of this approach. In December 2004, Hervé
Gaymard, the successor of Sarkozy as Finance
Minister, stated: “We must have, and not only in
France but also at the European level, an extremely
ambitious industrial policy. We must nurture or create
European champions in the industrial sector. We
strongly believe that in the face of globalisation we
cannot be naïve because … the law of the jungle is
always to allow the strong to gobble up the weak, and
there is no reason that Europe should drop its guard
in this global competition” (Financial Times, 4 De-
cember 2004). In January 2005, Jean-Louis Beffa,
CEO of Saint-Gobain, submitted a report to Jacques
Chirac recommending setting up a new agency for
development and innovation with the mission to tack-
le the perceived French weakness in high technology
areas. The aim was to promote French or European
industrial champions that would be technology win-
ners in a horizon of 10–15 years; the intended tools
were a few major programmes which, with co-financ-
ing from the private sector, would help overcome the
imperfection of capital markets in financing long-
term risky projects.5
By contrast, the European Commission has acknowl-
edged the challenges to the manufacturing base of the
EU but has maintained a commitment to horizontal
industrial policy. The Commission has argued: “The
main role of industrial policy is to provide the right
framework conditions for enterprise development and
innovation in order to make the EU an attractive
place for industrial investment and job creation …
From an industrial policy perspective, the role of pub-
lic authorities is to act only where needed, i.e. when
some types of market failures justify government
intervention or in order to foster structural change …
For these purposes the public authorities can make
use of policy instruments such as better regulation,
single market, innovation and research policy,
employment and social policies etc. that apply gener-
ally across the economy without distinction between
sectors or firms, together with other accompanying
measures to facilitate social and economic cohesion
… The Commission is committed to the horizontal
nature of industrial policy and to avoid a return to
selective interventionist policies.”6
There is thus a clear divergence of views between
those who favour sector-specific policies, and those
who believe that industrial policy should be limited to
broader horizontal policies. We address this issue in
Section 3, considering arguments for and against sec-
tor-specific policies. We first set out arguments in
favour of such policies, then consider their possible
side effects, as well as the serious difficulties of suc-
cessful implementation. We consider that there are
very limited occasions when a sector-specific policy is
likely to be useful; we propose that any such policies
should be limited in time and should not aim to con-
strain competition.
In Section 4 we go on to outline the need for horizon-
tal policies, cutting across sectors in the economy,
favoured by the European Commission. We take a
broad definition of horizontal policies, and in succes-
sive subsections, we consider industrial policies,
antitrust and regulation, and regional policies.
Consideration of these policies raises an important
issue, which we address in Section 5: at what level of
government should decisions on industrial policy be
made? Several issues arise here, including the costs
and benefits of competition between regions or coun-
tries, the availability of information and the extent to
which lobbying and capture is a problem at different
levels of government. One important element of this
discussion is the role of the Commission in overseeing
industrial policies. We question whether it should have
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4 For example, see the UK Industrial Strategy of 1975 and Beath
(2002).
5 See also the statement by President Sarkozy after the Strasbourg
European Summit of July 2, 2007. 6 European Commission (2005).EEAG Report 107
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a paternalistic role in intervening
in a member state’s policies that
do not have externalities beyond
the member state’s borders. Sec-
tion 6 sets out the conclusions. 
Before addressing arguments for
and against sector-specific poli-
cies, it is useful to briefly review
the state aid spending in the EU.
Of course, not all industrial poli-
cy is reflected in state aid spend-
ing, but it is useful to examine the
overall scale of such spending,
and its division between horizon-
tal and vertical dimensions. We
do this in Section 2.7
2. State aid in the EU
Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of EU state aid spend-
ing as a proportion of GDP between 1992 and 2005 as
well as the amounts allocated to horizontal objectives
and specific sectors. Overall, the proportion of GDP
allocated to horizontal measures has been relatively
stable, though falling gradually from 0.44 percent of
GDP in 1992 to only 0.35 percent in 2005. By con-
trast, there has been much more variation in sector-
specific aid. However, there was a marked fall at the
end of the 1990s, with such aid falling from a high of
0.57 percent of GDP in 1997 (when it accounted for
62 percent of all state aid) to only 0.09 percent of
GDP in 2005 (accounting for only 20 percent of the
total). Overall state aid has fallen from 0.74 percent of
GDP to 0.43 percent.
Figure 4.2 gives more detail about the composition of
horizontal state aid. There are a number of different
areas covered. There have also been significant
changes in the composition of this form of state aid
over this period of 14 years. In 1993, regional aid
accounted for 61 percent of all horizontal state aid.
By 2005, this had fallen to only 22 percent. By con-
trast, environmental aid – which effectively did not
exist in the early 1990s – now accounts for 30 percent
of all horizontal state aid. By contrast, the other cat-
egories in the table have been fairly stable. Aid to
research and development has risen from 11 percent
to 15 percent of the total (having reached 18 percent
in 2001). Aid to SMEs climbed steeply in the 1990s
from 13 percent of the total to 23 percent, but then
fell away again to only 12 percent by 2005.
Figure 4.3 gives details about the
composition of the sectoral aid
over the same period. There is
great variability in these propor-
tions over time. For example, the
financial sector received virtually
no state aid in 1992; yet in 1997 it
received as much as 57 percent of
the total sectoral aid. This large
increase explains the rise in total
sector aid as a proportion of
GDP in this year. Since then, its
share has again declined substan-
tially. By contrast, manufacturing
Figure 4.1
Figure 4.2
7 This chapter is partially based on Vives
(2006).sectors received 40 percent of total sectoral aid in
1992; this fell to only 11 percent in 2002 before recov-
ering to 20 percent in 2005. The transport sector has
become more important as a
recipient; it received no aid in
1992, but aid gradually increased
to 20 percent in 2005. However,
the largest recipient by some dis-
tance in both 1992 and 2005 –
though not always in the inter-
vening years – was coal.
More details of these aid pat-
terns are presented in Table 4.1,
which shows the aid in million
euros at 1995 prices. In these
terms, horizontal aid has been
roughly constant over time,
whereas sectoral aid has fallen by
nearly half. The amount devoted
to sectoral aid between 2001 and
2005 was, on average, 16 billion
euros, half the amount corresponding to years
1992–1995 and half the amount devoted to horizon-












Agriculture 16410  15671  15238 
Fisheries 436  354  404 
Horizontal objectives, of which  31000  29959  34732 
Commerce, export and internationalisation aid  1352 602  515 
Culture and heritage conservation  532 629  849 
Employment 516 1172  1972 
Energy  868 658  1376 
Environment  477 2006  8557 
Innovation  120 
Natural disasters  916 123  103 
Regional aid  18148 13346 9444 
Research and development 3880 4500  5691 
Risk capital 1 84 
SME  3977 5843  5188 
Social support to individual consumers 2
Training  329 1074 923 
Particular sectors, of which  30298  25861  16202 
Coal 12134 8536  7199 
Financial services  1359 8990  3956 
Manufacturing Sectors 14655 6377  2560 
Other Non Manufacturing sectors 504 357  306 
Other services 151 247  360 
Transport, of which  1492 1352  1819 
  Land transport and transport via pipelines 1  63  213 
Maritime transport 0 561  1191 
Inland water transport 15  27  12 
  Air transport 1483  688  258 
  Transport (unspecified) 27  143 
Total aid less agriculture, fisheries and transport 60250  54864  49571 
Total less railways 78629  72330  67083 
Source: European Commission, DG COMP scoreboard.EEAG Report 109
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trated primarily in manufactur-
ing sectors and coal; in the late
1990s, financial services received
the greatest amount, followed by
coal and then manufacturing sec-
tors. Towards the mid-2000s, sec-
toral help has concentrated in
coal, manufacturing sectors and
transport. There is also consider-
able variation across countries, as
shown in Table 4.2.
3. Sector-based industrial 
policies
The examination of the need for
sector-based industrial policies
should start by considering an
apparent paradox: recent studies
on industrial economies, which
highlight imperfections in the
market and strategic behaviour of
private and public sector econom-
ic agents, have provided numer-
ous arguments in favour of inter-
vention in theory; yet, in practice,
the consensus among economists
tends to be sceptical with regard
to intervention and recommends
prudence. Why is this so?
In a scenario of perfect competi-
tion and fully developed markets
with no frictions, there is no
room for government interven-
tion for economic efficiency pur-
poses. However, markets are far
from perfect. Phenomena such as
increasing returns to scale (be-
cause of fixed production costs,
for instance) and market power
normally associated with them,
disparities in information avail-
able to agents (“asymmetric in-
formation”in the economist’s jar-
gon), such as between producer
and consumer in terms of prod-
uct quality, and externalities (in-
teractions between agents,
whether in consumption or pro-
duction, not transmitted via the


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.cal spillovers or pollution, for instance) entail market
failures and open the way for government interven-
tion to improve the allocation of resources. However,
before we jump to the conclusion that industrial pol-
icy may correct market failures, we need to realise
that any intervention carries side effects that can be
pernicious.8
3.1 Arguments in favour of an active sector-based
industrial policy
Let us examine some factors that may in principle jus-
tify intervention at the industry level: fixed costs and
the implications for entry to the market, strategic
competition in international markets, declining indus-
tries, external effects, and coordination issues, and
imperfections in the capital market. 
Fixed costs and market entry 
When a company considers entering a market, private
profit need not match social benefit given that the
company disregards the external effects of its decision
(on consumers, in terms of new products and/or lower
prices, and on the profit of other companies). A prime
example is excessive entry in a market because poten-
tial entrants have no regard for the negative external
effects of their decision on the profits of established
companies. However, the theoretical results are by no
means robust and they depend on the type of compa-
ny rivalry (for instance, in terms of price or quantity)
and product features (level of product and quality dif-
ferentiation). The result is that the direction of re-
quired intervention (encouraging or limiting entry) is
difficult to determine as it depends on the industry’s
characteristics.9
Strategic competition in international markets
Protection or aid for industry, and for domestic com-
panies operating in an international oligopolistic
industry – that is, with few producers – relies on sev-
eral arguments that essentially boil down to the suit-
ability of utilising market power in favour of domes-
tic industry so as to transfer foreign revenues to
domestic companies. Strategic trade policy is based
on trying to endow domestic companies with a com-
petitive edge in the world market (through export sub-
sidies or R&D aid, for instance), and/or trying to cut
the native industry’s production cost.10
Dynamic economies of scale can stem from the expe-
rience curve. In certain industries (such as aeronautics,
shipbuilding and semiconductors), the production
cost per unit falls with the total accumulated produc-
tion volume by the company. In industries where the
experience curve is crucial, there are reasons for the
government to aid and protect the domestic industry
from international competition to speed up the learn-
ing process. This is the infant industry argument.11 It
is also worth highlighting that how government ought
to intervene depends on the industry’s characteristics
and that its benefits can be watered down by excessive
entry.12 Furthermore, if at the same time foreign
countries subsidise their own firms, the home country
may end up not being able to accumulate enough
knowledge so as to be competitive (and learning by
foreign rivals is slowed down).
The need for an active industrial policy in industries
subject to international competition has been stressed
on many occasions both in the US and Europe. For
example, Laura Tyson (former Chair of the US Coun-
cil of Economic Advisors) endorsed a defensive in-
dustrial policy, particularly in high-tech industries,
designed to force open world markets to US products
and offset subsidies available in other countries to cer-
tain industries (for example, in Europe for Airbus in
the aeronautics industry). One of Tyson’s key ideas
was that in a world where free trade is systematically
breached, a free-trade approach must be moderated
by enabling a tit-for-tat response to commercial of-
fences and unfair competition from rival countries.
The dumping policy of the EU and even more the
strategic industrial policy advocated by President
Sarkozy also seem to be in line with this view.
An extreme example of strategic trade policy is sup-
port and subsidy for “national champions” practised
in several European countries. However, it seems this
policy, where governments help their big corpora-
tions compete in the international market, has tradi-
tionally failed to produce the expected results.13 The
empirical evidence on the effects of strategic trade
EEAG Report 110
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8 In more technical terms: any intervention is subject to issues
derived from the theory of the second best. In a scenario that is not
efficient, if we move towards efficiency (say perfect competition) but
do not quite achieve it (increasing competition, for instance), there is
no assurance of any improvement to social well-being. To this, polit-
ical-economy considerations should be added. 
9 See Sections 4.3.2 and 6.6 in Vives (1999).
10 See Brander and Spencer (1983, 1985) and Krugman (1989).
Related issues were also discussed in Ch. 6 of last year’s EEAG
report.
11 See Melitz (2005) for a recent formulation of the conditions under
which infant industries should be protected. See Leahy and Neary
(1999a) for a qualification of the argument when governments can-
not precommit to a policy course.
12 See Eaton and Grossman (1986), and Horstman and Markusen
(1986).
13 Porter (1998).EEAG Report 111
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policy is not very favourable in terms of overall eco-
nomic welfare. In the best of cases, gains from this
policy are negligible.
A related argument in favour of national champions
is to secure supplies when there is market power
upstream. This applies with force in the energy sector
where size is important for bargaining in internation-
al markets (for example, in gas). 
Declining industries
With declining industries we have the issue of rescue,
restructuring and exit of inefficient companies, and in
the extreme, the demise of the industry. Theoretical
studies suggest that exit and restructuring can take
different forms if there is no intervention in the mar-
ket. The role of rationalisation policy can therefore
be to propose the best way in terms of efficiency and
fairness as a focal point. In general, if we allow affect-
ed companies to collude to form a “crisis cartel”,
rationalisation tends to be postponed and losses build
up, ultimately ending up with a much worse outcome.
In a scenario of inflexible wages and labour that is
costly to reallocate between industries in the short
term, aid for a declining industry can be efficient if it
is temporary.14 However, the subsidy may become
permanent due to pressure from stakeholders and
vested interests. Many subsidies in several countries
and industries were granted provisionally and
became indefinite. A permanent subsidy to an indus-
try that has had a non-transitory shock is inefficient
in the long run given that it delays or prevents the
industry from adjusting. It is also worth noting that
subsidies to declining industries highlight the poten-
tial conflict between efficiency and fairness goals. So,
for instance, considering that a provisional subsidy
tends to become permanent, a drop in price in the
industry concerned (say a worsening of the crisis)
would result in a cutback of the optimal subsidy for
reasons of efficiency, but should trigger an increase in
subsidy if the goal is to maintain income. The policy
to restructure failing industries has eaten up a signif-
icant portion of resources allocated to industrial pol-
icy in Europe.
External effects and coordination issues 
This argument for intervention is based on exter-
nal economies and stresses vertical connections
between industries (forward and backward links)
and coordination problems. Very often this argu-
ment has a regional dimension. A classic example
of investment coordination problems in a region is
the development of means of transportation, such
as a railway, and the setting up of firms in a
region. Without a railway, companies do not set up
in the region, yet if there are not enough compa-
nies, the railway has no source of business.
Furthermore, in general the presence of rail links
will not be sufficient to ensure growth in the
region; a minimum (or critical) mass of companies
is also needed.
One underlying issue is the small size of the domes-
tic market to support the required fixed costs of
investment. In this context there can be two stable
scenarios: one (development) with investment and
broadening of the market and the other (underde-
velopment trap) with no investment and mainte-
nance of a narrow market.15 Thus investment in
certain industries generating positive external
effects can be justified and can achieve a superior
equilibrium by addressing the issue of coordina-
tion of investment and avoiding the underdevelop-
ment trap. However, this argument has been the
subject of criticism when applied to developed
countries and high-tech industries, given that the
significant market is the international one rather
than a local one. And in any event, if an industry
with international spillovers is aided, such as a
high-tech one, a country is actually helping com-
petitors.16
Similarly, protection of nascent industries can be
justified. If a domestic industry with positive
external effects is not protected, it might never
develop given that its average unit cost may always
remain higher than the international price. On the
other hand, provisional protection can allow it to
grow and increase overall production, cutting aver-
age cost to a point below the international price.
Then the industry can be opened to foreign com-
petition.17
A final example of a coordination problem that pub-
lic intervention can help to resolve is in setting stan-
dards. The relative success in the development of
mobile telephony in Europe is attributed to an early
adoption of the GSM standard.
14 In fact, a negative shock in an industry would trigger, in the
absence of government intervention, a fall in employment that is
inefficient, because the ideal in the short term is to keep jobs (and
lower wages). See Flam et al. (1983) and Neven and Vickers (1992).
15 See, for instance, Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Scitovsky (1954) and
Murphy et al. (1989) for modern modelling of the “big push theory”.
16 See Grossman (1990).
17 See Itoh et al. (1991).Imperfections in the capital market 
One source of market imperfection is based on infor-
mation disparities between those wanting capital and
those offering it. Companies needing capital may be
better informed of the quality of their business pro-
ject than investors. This makes it difficult for investors
to assess the likelihood of success of the company
needing the funds. The assessment of this likelihood is
crucial given that companies have limited liability; if
they fail they file for bankruptcy, and only have to
meet their liabilities from shareholder funds. The
asymmetry of information in the capital market will
be particularly significant in new industries and fast-
moving technology industries. 
Given this asymmetric information problem, financial
markets may push a firm into bankruptcy too soon or
too late. This may depend on bankruptcy procedures.
(For example, in the UK and Germany the procedures
favour less reorganisation than in France or the US.)18
Limited liability pushes in the direction of firms tak-
ing too much risk and the gamble for resurrection
may keep firms out of bankruptcy too long. On the
other hand, absolute priority rules (higher priory
creditors being paid first and in full) may induce fail-
ure too soon, as the creditors face a coordination
problem in the reorganisation procedure.
Similarly, the problem of selective interest rate sub-
sidies for certain industries is that there are situa-
tions where the subsidy will encourage companies
with a higher likelihood of success to seek loans,
while there are other situations where the opposite
will happen. One or the other situation will apply
subject to features of the risks and asymmetry of
information in the market. Accordingly, a lot of
knowledge is required on industry characteristics to
assess the suitability of a tax or a subsidy on the cost
of capital.19
3.2 Side effects and problems in implementing 
sector-specific industrial policies
There are several broad problems with the implemen-
tation of sector-specific policies. The first issue is
that, as has repeatedly been emphasised above, the
type of intervention required very much depends on
the industry’s characteristics. Technology, demand
conditions, level of product differentiation, risk level,
asymmetries in information, type and level of com-
petition, and many other factors all influence suitable
industrial policy measures. This means that the infor-
mation requirements of intervention to correct market
failures are extremely high, especially so, given that in
general the direction of intervention is ambiguous a
priori. There are several elements of the information
requirements. The government needs to correctly
identify a market failure; it must also correctly iden-
tify the possibility of welfare gains from correcting
the market failure in a particular way; given this, it
also needs to design a policy that will induce appro-
priately different behaviour from economic agents
that will correct the market failure. These are
extremely demanding conditions. Highly detailed
econometric and institutional studies, able to ascer-
tain and measure structural characteristics and
behaviour of companies, are needed in order to inter-
vene successfully in a market. This applies to all types
of intervention under examination.
A second issue in an international context involves the
effects of strategic behaviour of countries. For ins-
tance, reprisals from countries affected by unilateral
measures designed to promote or protect native indus-
try can quickly degenerate into a widespread trade
war where everyone loses. Ultimately, protection and
aid can trigger reprisals in other countries, resulting in
losses for all countries involved in the trade war. The
outcome can be a stable situation that is inferior to
free trade in terms of economic welfare.20 Similar sit-
uations arise in international restructuring of indus-
tries in crisis where governments do their best to min-
imise domestic downsizing, as a whole worsening the
problem of surplus capacity. Here an international
multilateral restructuring agreement for the industry
can be much more successful. There is evidence that in
Europe, governments have attempted to transfer the
cost of restructuring declining industries to other
countries.21
Third, there are the political economy issues of inter-
vention. In fact, any intervention or regulation leads
to “capturing” opportunities for stakeholders and
pressure groups. In this way, provisional subsidies or
protection may become permanent and so interven-
tion serves the private rather than public interest.
Meanwhile, companies can incur expenditure to pres-
sure the authorities or influence public opinion to
secure benefits from government. This is particularly
so in regulated markets and those subject to govern-
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18 See White (2005).
19 See Grossman (1990), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), DeMeza and
Webb (1987), and White (2005, 2007).
20 See, for instance, Dixit and Kyle (1985).
21 See Neven and Vickers (1992).EEAG Report 113
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ment intervention. In fact, it has been claimed that
governments pick losers (or ailing sectors) instead of
winners because policy is influenced by pressure
groups that lobby to appropriate rents. In sectors that
are growing, entry of new firms erodes such rents but
in declining sectors sunk costs of entry typically limit
entry. The end result is that firms in declining sectors
lobby harder because they are protected from entry. In
this sense, losers pick government policy (see Baldwin
and Robert-Nicoud 2007).
Fourth, protection and aid measures for industry can
impair competition and have a negative effect on pro-
duction efficiency. Protected environments tend to
generate inefficiencies. To quote John Hicks (1935):
“The best monopoly profit is a quiet life.”Inadequate
or insufficient effort to cut costs has been called X-
inefficiency. Pressure from a competitive market is
crucial to limit such inefficiency.22 In particular, the
role of potential competition can be highly effective
at cutting costs and reducing X-inefficiency of estab-
lished companies. In fact, a company that has
enjoyed market dominance in the form of high costs
will have a competitive disadvantage when faced with
potential new entrants (as experienced for example by
certain US airlines during the industry’s deregulation
process).
An added reason explaining cost increases due to lack
of competition is the rent-seeking effort to secure a
monopolistic position. Therefore, companies with
market power, endeavouring to achieve or maintain
their monopoly, can invest strategically in production
capacity, technology, product development or adver-
tising, in a way that does not minimise production
costs and is far from ideal in social terms. Among
these activities, it is worth highlighting those designed
to prevent entry of potential rivals, either by installing
surplus capacity or excessive proliferation of product
variety. Furthermore, managers and workers attempt-
ing to extract rents from firms may only do so if those
firms make supra-competitive profits in product mar-
kets. In general, actions aimed at achieving a protect-
ed or monopolistic position can generate high costs
through which rents are dissipated. A significant por-
tion of costs incurred are useless in social terms
(though part of them might merely be income trans-
fers, for instance, from business owners to managers
or workers).23
The empirical evidence suggests that it is precisely the
exit of inefficient establishments and firms and the
entry of efficient ones that drive productivity im-
provements. The sluggishness in the exit of inefficient
firms in the EU is one of the main reasons why the
EU lags behind in productivity growth in relation to
the US.24 Rescue and restructuring aid may prevent
the exit of such low productivity establishments.
Finally, the cost of intervention includes the efficien-
cy cost of raising the required funds. These costs
include both administrative and compliance costs of
collecting taxes, and also “deadweight” costs generat-
ed by taxes, which distort the behaviour of economic
agents. This means that the marginal cost of public
funds (that is, of raising one dollar for government
spending through taxes) is likely to exceed one dollar.
In the US estimates range from $1.17 to $1.57. In
other words, every time the US government spends
one dollar, the actual implicit cost to the economy can
be as much as 50 percent higher.25 Evidence from the
EU varies considerably, and also depends on the
country. Some evidence suggests that the implicit cost
is even higher than in the US.26 This may be because
Europe has higher marginal tax rates than the US,
which hence tend to create greater distortions and
“deadweight” costs. The conclusion is that on con-
ducting a cost/benefit analysis of any industrial poli-
cy, the cost needs to be adjusted upwards to reflect
accurately the implicit cost of tax collection in terms
of the distortions to the economic system.
One can illustrate the difficulties of sectoral interven-
tion with the case of industries subject to R&D
spillovers in an open economy. It has been claimed
that the firms generating those spillovers towards
other domestic firms should be subsidised. This is so
when those spillovers occur in industries characterised
by monopolistic competition where there is free entry
(that is, there are no excess profits and each firm is
negligible in relation to the market).27 However, if the
industries are oligopolistic the situation is more com-
plex. Then a tax or a subsidy may be optimal depend-
ing on the character of spillovers and the competition
mode in the industry. Optimal subsidies should then
be carefully fine-tuned for each industry.28 This is
22 See also the discussion in Section 4 of Chapter 4 of this EEAG
Report.
23 There is accumulated evidence of the pernicious effect of market
power on production efficiency. See Vives (2007) and references
therein.
24 See Foster et al. (2001) for the US; Disney et al. (2003) for the UK,
and Bartelsmann et al. (2004) for an international comparison
including Europe.
25 See Ballard et al (1985), Jorgenson and Yun (1990, 1991), and
Martin and Anderson (2005).
26 Kleven and Kreiner (2006) generate very large estimates of the
marginal cost of public funds for some countries when accounting
for labour force participation responses.
27 See Grossman and Helpman (1991).
28 See Leahy and Neary (1999b).obviously difficult, even without counting on possible
retribution measures of trade partners.
In summary, although there are in principle a number
of legitimate reasons for a sector-based industrial pol-
icy, the side effects of those policies are likely to undo
the potential benefits and result in net welfare losses
once all effects have been accounted for. Horizontal
policies, in contrast, have a much better chance to
generate net welfare gains in the social cost-benefit
assessment.
4. Horizontal policies
Problems in implementing a sector-based industrial
policy as well as available evidence from several coun-
tries explain the preference amongst economists and
the European Commission for horizontal-type mea-
sures that are not targeted towards specific sectors in
the economy. We now look at some reasons for hori-
zontal intervention.
4.1 Horizontal industrial policies
First, R&D and innovation activities are classic cases
of potential market failure that is highly significant
due to its dynamic effects on productivity growth.29
The production of knowledge and innovation both
have the features of a public good and have significant
external effects on the economy. The use of knowl-
edge by an individual or company does not diminish
use by others. In fact, producers of knowledge or
innovations face difficulties when trying to appropri-
ate their results because it is difficult to prevent others
from using them. The patent system is designed pre-
cisely to ensure a return on investment in R&D activ-
ities. However, the prevention of innovation and
knowledge leakages to the rest of the economy carries
a cost, given that technology breakthroughs are dis-
seminated less. There is a debate on whether the
patent system is sufficient to foster the production of
knowledge and innovation or if it, to the contrary,
fosters duplication of effort and social inefficiency.30
What is clear is that basic knowledge without direct
commercial application has very substantial spillovers
to the economy that cannot be appropriated by the
scientists. There is evidence of substantial knowledge
spillovers at the different levels in the R&D and pro-
duction processes.31 If, to this, we add potential
imperfections in the capital market to fund R&D
activities (due to asymmetric information it is
extremely difficult to externally assess a company’s
research activity), the result is that subsidising basic
research may be justified in social terms. The subsidy
becomes more debatable when we move towards the
application and development phases that can be put
to commercial use. Subsidies should be channelled
directly to R&D activity rather than be subsidies for
production of marketable goods (except in the case of
industries subject to the experience curve, discussed in
Section 3.1). Aid for research, whether basic or
applied (subsidy for a university, research centres, or
tax breaks for innovative companies) are generally
horizontal in nature, though they can be strategically
used – industry-wide – as a strategic trade policy in
the international market context.
We must also stress the danger of aid becoming a
transfer that does nothing to change the overall R&D
effort; rather it may merely increase profits of compa-
nies that already do R&D.32 It is extremely difficult to
evaluate whether already existing government aid for
private R&D activity in OECD countries is ideal,
excessive or insufficient.33 However, traditional low
levels of R&D effort in Europe as compared to the US
and Japan perhaps suggest insufficient aid levels.
Second, training of human capita represents another
case of potential market failure. This is induced by
externalities. There may be insufficient private incen-
tives to accumulate human capital. On the one hand,
companies tend to invest little in multi-skill training,
given that once trained, workers can leave and join
another company. On the other hand, workers will
invest in education only if there is a sufficiently devel-
oped industrial and services sector to allow them to
leverage their investment. In the sphere of higher edu-
cation and basic research, the problem worsens given
that benefits (which may be very important in social
terms) may be difficult to appropriate privately.
Potential market failure in the accumulation of
human capital happens in a context of imperfect
financial markets given that otherwise workers could
fund their own training. Note that some horizontal
human capital training measures need not be neutral
across sectors. For example, if they target software
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30 See Boldrin and Levine (2002, 2006). According to them, markets
for ideas are not different from other markets and governments
should not foster innovation by providing monopoly franchises.
Instead, they claim, proven mechanisms such as subsidies should be
used.
31 See, among others, Caballero and Jaffe (1993), Agrawal, Cockburn
and McHale (2006), and Moretti (2004).
32 This possibility is empirically highlighted in David et al. (2000).
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engineers they would tend to favour IT-intensive sec-
tors and firms.
Third, the establishment of a brand image could be
associated with market failures. In markets where con-
sumers are short of information on product quality,
new producers will be at a disadvantage relative to
established companies with a reputation for product
quality. Poor-quality producers drag down other pro-
ducers of their country who are trying to establish a
reputation for quality. The way to offset this negative
effect is not, however, through production subsidies;
rather it is by establishing minimum quality levels and
control over enforcement of warranty clauses.
These horizontal measures, and some sector-based
ones, are even more significant for SMEs, which
account for a substantial share of output and employ-
ment in several countries in the EU. SMEs can be
severely affected by imperfections in financial markets
as they have less capacity to self-finance and diversify
to meet the fixed cost of directly accessing capital
markets. Furthermore, they can be too small, particu-
larly in terms of ability to establish sales networks, cre-
ate brand image and incur fixed costs needed to inter-
nationalise the business. However, empirical studies
show that they tend to be more flexible and innovative,
contrary to the Schumpeterian theory that suggests
that large companies innovate proportionally more
than small ones due to available economies of scale in
R&D activities and a large company’s potential to
diversify. In fact, empirical evidence on the relation-
ship between firm size and R&D activity suggests that
the innovation process does not provide economies of
scale with regard to size of the company where R&D
activities are carried out. In fact, large companies do
not make a greater R&D effort, relative to size, than
smaller companies: R&D expenditure grows, at most,
in proportion to company size. There is also evidence
that the number of patents granted per unit of R&D
expenditure is higher for smaller companies. The
specificity of SMEs suggests the need to design a hor-
izontal policy adapted to their needs, to include
encouragement of cooperation agreements to estab-
lish sales networks, brand image, R&D, and provision
of specialist services.
4.2 Antitrust policies and regulation
Another fundamental component of a horizontal
microeconomic policy is to ensure a framework for
the smooth functioning of markets in order to keep
them competitive. There are two aspects to this. The
first is the need to preserve competition through
antitrust policy. The second is to maintain regulations
only where they are needed and to lessen the burden
of compliance. We discuss each in turn.
Antitrust policy
An important point to realise is that keeping the mar-
kets competitive requires public intervention: this is
the role of competition policy. This policy has a long
tradition in the US, going back to the 19th century
with the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
The core antitrust principles in the EU are laid down
in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome.
The need for antitrust policy has been questioned in
a context of openness to international trade, such
as, for instance, with European integration. The rea-
soning is based on the notion that the best antitrust
policy is to open up to external trade. Industrial pol-
icy in Europe in the 1960s was based on the need for
large corporations to compete effectively with the
US, then unarguably the economic leader. The belief
was that formation of large, European-wide corpo-
rations along with the removal of internal trade bar-
riers, would foster economies of scale with no dan-
ger of significant increase in market power.
Accordingly, the European Commission favoured
mergers.
However, although it is true that opening up to the
international market increases the degree of competi-
tion, two points need to be made. First, external com-
petition as a disciplining mechanism only applies to
internationally marketable goods. Industrial sectors
have been increasingly exposed to a rise in overseas
competition in step with globalisation. But this has
not generally been the case for most services: either
because they are not internationally marketable, or
because of regulation, they have been mostly sheltered
from competition. The lack of competition in the ser-
vices industry in the EU has major repercussions on
overall international competitiveness by increasing
costs. The services industry is highly heterogeneous,
yet in general its productivity growth rate is lower
than that of manufacturing, perhaps because it is
inherently more difficult to raise productivity in more
labour-intensive industries. Thus, equal wage increas-
es in manufacturing and services have a very different
knock-on effect on prices. 
There appears to be plenty of margin to increase com-
petition in the services industry: in transportation,telecoms, healthcare, the energy sector, professional
services, retail trade, and also in the knowledge indus-
try (universities and research centres).
Bringing in more competition is crucial inasmuch as
opening up to international trade is only possible to a
certain extent. The need for an active antitrust policy
in recently deregulated industries to prevent unfair
practices or dominance by ex-monopolies from
undermining the purpose of deregulation should be
underlined. The EU Competition Directorate has
recently drawn up reports on several network indus-
tries (energy, financial services, telecoms) highlighting
competition problems. Furthermore, competitive
pressure is also crucial in order to induce firms to
adopt innovations (this is particularly important in
the service sector). The lower competitive pressure in
Europe is blamed for the slower pace of IT technolo-
gy adoption with deleterious effects on productivity
growth relative to the US.34
Vigorous domestic competition can be a source of
competitiveness internationally. Recent studies on
international competitiveness of industries clearly
suggest this. Examples of industries with a significant
level of domestic rivalry and which have been interna-
tionally competitive for a long time are pharmaceuti-
cals in Switzerland, automotive industry in Sweden,
chemicals in Germany, and computers and software in
the US.35
One potential conflict between competition policy
and industrial policy is the control over concentra-
tion. On the one hand, concentration may increase
economic efficiency by enabling economies of scale,
yet on the other it may increase market power in the
domestic market. Here we should distinguish
between horizontal concentration, which tends to
increase the market power of firms, and vertical and
conglomerate ones, which typically involve efficien-
cies derived from the mergers of complementary
activities. The conflict becomes acute when it comes
to the promotion of national champions (as dis-
cussed in EEAG 2002 and 2007) and is diluted when
large firms are formed in an integrated European
market. Be it as it may, sometimes the protection of
national champions may be accomplished indirectly
(for example, setting minimum wages for postal
workers in Germany raises barriers to entry in the
sector).36
Regulation
Another aspect of the influence of government on
competitiveness is through regulation. Excessive reg-
ulation is likely to generate a loss of competitiveness
for domestic firms subject to that regulation. How-
ever, there are many reasons for the establishment of
regulations, such as the protection of the labour
force or the environment. Regulation should also be
established in situations where competition is not
workable such as with natural monopoly segments
like transport or distribution in electricity or gas
markets.
In general, though, regulation should be non-intru-
sive and, in particular, the “cost of doing business” in
a country should be kept low. In this respect the scores
attained by several countries in the EU are not very
encouraging. The World Bank Doing Business report
collects indicators on the ease of starting a business,
dealing with licenses, employing workers, registering
property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying
taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and
closing a business in a universe of 175 countries.
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Table 4.3
Ease of Doing Business Rank
2007 2006 2005 
Denmark 5  5  7 
United  Kingdom 6 6 5 
Ireland 8  8  10 
Iceland  10 11 11 
Norway 11  10  8 
Finland  13 14 13 
Sweden 14 13 14 
Switzerland  16 15 16 
Estonia 17 18 17 
Belgium 19 19 20 
Germany  20 16 21 
Netherlands 21 23 22 
Latvia 22 20 31 
Austria 25 22 30 
Lithuania 26 24 15 
France 31 32 47 
Slovakia 32 31 34 
Portugal 37 42 45 
Spain  38 38 38 
Hungary 45 51 60 
Romania 48 55 71 
Italy  53 50 69 
Slovenia 55 53 56 
Czech Republic 56  61  50 
Poland  74 68 74 
Greece 100  95  111 
United  States 3 3 3 
Japan  12 12 12 
Source: World Bank Doing Business 2007.EEAG Report 117
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Table 4.3 provides the 2007 ranking for the EU coun-
tries and compares it with Japan and the US.
According to this ranking, the Nordic countries
(Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland)
are among the top 15 economies where doing busi-
ness is easiest. The US, the UK, Ireland and Japan
are among the top ten countries. Two Eastern
European countries (Lithuania and Estonia) are
ranked among the 20 most flexible economies for
doing business. However, Romania, the Czech
Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, and Poland are situat-
ed at the bottom of the European ranking and two
southern European countries are placed at the bot-
tom (Italy and Greece).
4.3 Regional policies
External effects in the local sphere induce a new
dimension in industrial policy, linked to regional
policy. Economic activity develops in a physical
space, it is localised and needs infrastructure. Infra-
structure, in broad terms including not just physical
capital (for example in transport, communications
and energy) but also human capital, is a classic
source of external effects and is key to modern
growth theories. In fact, the existence of infrastruc-
ture thresholds, notably the level of human capital
below which a region is unable to take off and
remains trapped in a stable, low-growth situation is a
distinct possibility. In the presence of external fac-
tors, (competitive) markets need not allocate re-
sources efficiently. We have already mentioned the
issue of coordinating investment in economic devel-
opment and incentives for research and innovation.
The literature on economic geography suggests that
a significant portion of external effects linked to
market size are felt locally or regionally.37 Conse-
quently, support for industries with external effects
need not be dissipated to other regions.
Two examples of external effects in the local sphere
arise from geographic concentration of production
and specialisation of the labour market.
First, industrial production tends to concentrate in
certain regions. This is due to the interaction of
economies of scale in production and transport costs.
In the presence of increasing returns, companies seek
to set up in a single location that is also near the “cen-
tre” of the market at a point with high density of
demand in order to minimise transport costs.
Demand in the centre (market size) will depend on the
number of companies deciding to set up shop, gener-
ating a feedback mechanism that reinforces the con-
solidation of industrial cities and regions (“centre” as
opposed to a non-industrialised “periphery”). The
consequence of these phenomena is that location of
industrial production is uncertain at the outset and
can be significantly influenced by industrial policy
measures to encourage location of companies in a cer-
tain geographical location. Relatively small interven-
tions can have significant effects.
European integration reduces trade and transport
costs in general and will therefore tend to favour geo-
graphical concentration, leveraging economies of
scale and of agglomeration (recall for instance that in
the US – a large and integrated market – industry is
more geographically concentrated than in Europe).
The reorganisation of production gives rise to major
uncertainties: the periphery (the new entrants, say)
still has lower wages, yet it may be far from the mar-
ket centre. Depending on circumstances (and in par-
ticular reductions in trade and/or transport costs),
proximity to market or cost advantage can take prece-
dence. Without international trade, periphery coun-
tries (small and with lower wages) cannot achieve
economies of scale and a high level of competition.
Total openness (with no frictions, with low transport
or trade costs) favours them, yet a partial reduction in
trade costs (and/or transport costs) can result in con-
centration of activity in the centre.38
Second, a large local market facilitates development
and training of human capital. We have already seen
how there may be insufficient private incentives for
training human capital. It should be stressed that
workers themselves will only invest in education if
there is a sufficiently diversified industrial and ser-
vices sector to ensure the return on their investment.
Furthermore, where companies endure idiosyncratic
shocks, a larger market can provide insurance mecha-
nisms both for companies, to avoid bottlenecks due to
excess labour demand, and for workers, by providing
diversified employment options.
The potential significance of external effects provides
a potential field of action for an industrial policy
intertwined with local and regional policy. This
involves devising policies geared to the environment
where positive external effects occur.39 Their existence
37 See Krugman (1991).
38 Krugman and Venables (1990).
39 Obviously, from a certain size of local or regional entity, external
negative effects, such as congestion, appears.is indicated by existing company groupings in a phys-
ical space (such as the software industry in Silicon
Valley). In fact, a recent study (Greenstone and
Moretti 2004) shows positive net results for regions in
the US that have subsidised the installation of new
productive plants. García-Milà and McGuire (2002)
argue that agglomeration externalities may justify
local subsidies for the establishment of headquarters.
Davis and Henderson (2004) and Strauss-Kahn and
Vives (2006) provide evidence in favour of this con-
clusion.
However, it should be noted that those studies do
not analyse the potential neutralising effects of the
subsidy game among regions. In fact, any govern-
ment action will give rise to the problems mentioned
above in discussing sector-based policies, due to the
introduction of strategic inter-regional (or interna-
tional) competition. This raises the more general
question of the level of government at which indus-
trial policy should be determined. We now turn to
this issue.
5. At what level of government should industrial
policies be determined?
Industrial policy could be determined at a sub-nation-
al, national or supra-national level. The choice
between these is not straightforward and depends on
a number of factors. Most important is the possibili-
ty – if policies are determined at anything lower than
a supra-national level – of strategic interaction bet-
ween competing governments. This mirrors the issues
discussed in our 2007 EEAG report on tax competi-
tion between EU member states.40 Whether industrial
policy should be subject to competition between gov-
ernments depends on the nature of the competition
and the likely outcome of that competition. Other
important factors in the choice of the appropriate
level of decision-making, either for government or for
the regulator, are information, degree of competence
and capture possibilities. Regional governments and
regulators may have better information than the cen-
tral government, their degree of competence may be
lower because of a lack of scale, and different forces
impinge on capture possibilities. On the one hand, the
central government may be more easily captured by
lobbyists than regional governments because of the
concentration of efforts of lobbyists where it is more
effective. On the other hand, the proximity to the
regional government/regulator is greater and may
facilitate capture.
5.1 Regional competition
Governments may compete over a variety of policies
in order to attract capital, firms, profit and other
income flows to its jurisdiction. Probably the most
debated policy concerns the taxing of corporate
profit. Here it is most likely that governments com-
pete for mobile capital and firms, driving down
source-based taxes on capital; the reduction in tax
revenue from these sources implies the need either to
raise revenue from other (less mobile) sources or to
reduce public spending. But governments may also
compete over the provision of infrastructure, regula-
tion of labour markets, financial markets, product
standards and the environment. Several of these pol-
icy measures might form part of industrial policy, as
defined earlier.
There are two possible models of competition between
regions that are not mutually exclusive. Under the
first, regions compete in terms of location, variety of
resources and perhaps also in terms of “culture”,
both generally and in corporate terms. This would be
a  horizontal competition model where all regions
would have a role to play.
Under the second model, regions are differentiated
by the quality of the core services and infrastruc-
ture they have to offer. Therefore they compete ver-
tically: given the same tax rates, all companies
would favour regions offering higher quality.
Clearly, without external aid, regions that seek to
offer more services will generally have to levy high-
er taxes. The implications of this sort of competi-
tion are significant, because in the event that invest-
ment in “quality” is inherently fixed in nature, such
as spending on infrastructure, there may be a “nat-
ural oligopoly” in the inter-regional market. In
other words, given certain basic conditions, there is
a maximum number of active regions in the sense
that only a few can attract investment and/or
demand for services. Entry of new high-quality
regions can displace low-quality regions that until
then had competed successfully in the international
market. So, for instance, a country with low-quality
tourism infrastructure can de displaced by the entry
of regions with a better quality offering forcing
other high-quality countries to compete fiercely via
pricing. Furthermore, the entry of low-price com-
petitors can ultimately erode the first country’s
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options. The absence of an active infrastructure
policy can therefore lead to the downfall of a region
“sandwiched” between better quality and cheaper
offerings.
If vertical differentiation components dominate, the
number of successful “enclaves” might be limited in
Europe and the success of some regions might be
linked to the downfall of others. The optimal policy
to follow for a large and a small region need not be the
same. Take the case of innovation activities. Large
metropolitan regions such as London and Paris may
afford to pursue a laissez-faire policy. By investing in
infrastructure (in terms of human and technological
capital), large areas can build on critical mass, profit-
ing from a dense market of versatile, skilled person-
nel, to allow global connections to bloom. In con-
trast, smaller regions may need to rely on a few key
sectors and a battery of more active support policies
in the area of innovation to overcome the critical mass
problem.
Even so, a tendency towards diversification can also
be observed in the smaller cities. This is the case in
Stuttgart and Dublin, for example. The regional gov-
ernment in Stuttgart intervened to initiate a restruc-
turing of production based on innovative sectors to
confront the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s due,
among other factors, to international competition
from low-cost countries. The basic clusters in Baden-
Württemberg revolve around the area of mechanical
engineering and the automobile industry, with an
expenditure on R&D only below that of Bavaria.
Bavaria has banked on implementing an industrial
policy of establishing centres of excellence in certain
technological fields to promote synergies between
research and enterprise. The most notable are the
clusters of ICT (led by Siemens, Infineon and sub-
sidiaries of Oracle and Microsoft), media and
biotechnology (which have made it the second Euro-
pean centre after London). 41 In Dublin, an active pol-
icy has been followed in the electronics, pharmaceuti-
cal and financial sectors (though there is more pro-
duction than R&D). Helsinki has led the transforma-
tion of Finland towards high technology with Nokia
at the head. The ICT cluster was promoted by a rapid
liberalisation of the telecommunications market, a
tradition in advanced engineering and a culture of
cooperation among companies in the cluster, and
between companies and universities and research cen-
tres. Helsinki is also trying to diversify outside ICT
into fields such as biomedicine and creative activities.
In the case of Finland, the coordinated effort between
the public and private sectors in R&D is perceived to
be a key to success.
Strategic competition between regions of either hor-
izontal or vertical form will, in principle, fail to pro-
duce efficient results in global terms given externali-
ties that exist between regions. So, for instance, if
regional investments in infrastructure are substitutes
– generating negative external effects between them –
there tends to be too much investment. If they com-
plement each other, generating positive externalities,
there will tend to be too little investment. This
implies that theoretically regions could improve their
situation by cooperating instead of competing. This
relates to the idea of the “selection principle” (Sinn
1997, 2003). Industrial policies (and other policies)
reflect governments’ attempts to correct the failures
of markets. Within a single country, the national
government may be in a position to offset the exis-
tence of positive or negative externalities arising in
the private market. However, if that country is open
to flows of trade, capital and even labour, then exter-
nalities will not stop at the border. Just as competi-
tion between private firms cannot correct the exter-
nalities, neither should we expect competition
between governments to correct the externalities. It
is in precisely the areas in which governments may
intervene to attempt to correct market failure that
competition between governments cannot result in
such a correction.
However, in asymmetric situations, and in the pres-
ence of information disparities, competition
among regional governments could increase wel-
fare. The reason is that competition induces firms
to locate where they add more value since a gov-
ernment will offer more than another only if the
external benefits are larger in the first region than
in the second. Subsidy competition elicits informa-
tion and is efficient as in an auction.42 Competition
among regions to attract firms will produce effi-
cient outcomes when the deadweight loss of taxa-
tion is low and regions are asymmetric in the sense
that external benefits of firms’location are uneven-
ly distributed.
As well as problems concerning competition, two
other factors should influence where industrial poli-
cies are determined. First, as noted above in the con-
41 See Vives and Torrens (2005). 42 See Besley and Seabright (1999) and Fumagalli (2003).text of sector-specific policies, any successful industri-
al policy requires a considerable amount of informa-
tion. It is possible that information about a specific
region may be available to policy-makers in central
government, but it seems plausible that information
problems are more severe at the central level than a
regional level. This therefore represents a factor which
suggests that policy should be determined at a region-
al level.
Second, also as noted above, governments may be
subject to capture by lobbyists. It seems plausible that
this is more likely to happen at a centralised level.
Lobbying is costly; lobbyists will therefore concen-
trate their resources on those policy-makers who have
the most influence. For example, if a small number of
policy-makers are influential in setting policy for the
whole of the EU, then we can expect them to be the
target of lobbyists who may be willing to invest large
amounts in influencing their decisions. However, at
the other extreme, if policy is determined at a region-
al level then (a) the gains from influencing the region-
al policy-maker may be smaller and (b) the cost of
having an influence in all regions is much higher.
These considerations indicate that the problems of
lobbying will be more severe in a world of centralised
decision-making: this may help explain the larger fre-
quency of such lobbying activity in the US compared
to the EU, which is much less centralised. Despite this,
proximity to a regional or national government may
work in the opposite direction and facilitate capture at
lower levels.
To complicate matters further, the degree of compe-
tence of a government may be directly related to its
size (for example, only large institutions can afford to
hire the best civil servants).
Two interesting casual observations may be made
here. First, there is a tendency towards the formation
of larger regions to cooperate in certain matters in the
EU, fostered by improvements in transport and com-
munications, and the benefits to profit from eco-
nomies of scale. Second, however, it is smaller states
(that correspond more closely to economic regions)
that tend to adopt more innovative measures in the
face of globalisation (for example, Finland in educa-
tion, R&D and IT, Denmark and the Netherlands in
the welfare state, and Sweden for the reforms dis-
cussed in the 2007 EEAG Report).
Overall, we believe there are good reasons to consid-
er allowing regions to determine industrial policy,
possibly competing with each other. This is so be-
cause externalities are basically at the regional level
and the regions have an information advantage in
choosing policies. Competition should not be waste-
ful as long as the costs of public funds is not too high
and asymmetries between regions important. Note
that there is notable diversity of performance across
the regions of the EU, and that this diversity does not
tend to diminish (though there is convergence across
nation-states).43
However, there is in any case a role for the EU to
play in providing a framework of common rules to
internalise externalities and limit rent-shifting incen-
tives. For example, it could be argued that European
funds (such as R&D support) should be allocated on
a merit basis through competitive bidding proce-
dures, which should be decided by committees of
experts insulated as much as possible from political
pressures. The model of the European Research
Council to allocate funds to science, modelled after
the US National Science Foundation, is a good
example. The EU seems to be well placed to deter-
mine general horizontal industrial policy measures
as a response to the challenges posed by globalisa-
tion. Another example would be to set a common
energy policy that diversifies supply sources and the
portfolio of technologies in a large integrated EU
energy market.
Before turning to the process of reform of state aid
control in the EU, let us mention that decision mak-
ing at the national level (for large multi-regional coun-
tries) may suffer from lack of scale to confront the
problems posed by globalisation and high capture
possibilities. This would suggest deferring decisions
on matters that involve only local externalities to the
regions, while allowing the EU to deal with matters
with important cross-regional externalities, which will
naturally lead to cross-border spillovers.
5.2 State aid control in the EU
EU policy has moved towards requiring a well-
defined objective, market failure or other objective of
common interest, in order to allow the state aid. In
the traditional approach economic analysis was
downplayed. The definition of what constitutes state
aid (according to Article 87(1) of the Treaty) was
dealt with by the “market investor principle” –
according to which investments by public authorities
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in companies carrying out economic activities are
considered free of aid if they are made on terms that
a private investor operating under market conditions
would have accepted – and “selectivity” of the mea-
sure in terms of granting the advantage. The “distor-
tion of competition” and “trade affectation” criteria
were dealt with in a summary, and sometimes incon-
sistent, way. The presumption of positive effects (such
as spillovers) in different situations led to setting dif-
ferent thresholds for aid (for example, R&D industri-
al research expenditure could be funded up to 50 per-
cent of eligible costs).
With the State Aid Action Plan44 the guideline has
become “less and better targeted state aid”. That is,
“state aid should only be used when it is an appropri-
ate instrument for meeting a well-defined objective,
when it creates the right incentives, is proportionate
and when it distorts competition to the least possible
extent.”The statement implies the following “balanc-
ing test” to check whether state aid should be
allowed: (1) State aid must address a market failure
or another agreed common interest objective; (2) it
must be targeted to the objective; and (3) possible
competitive and trade distortions must be limited so
that the balance is positive. The Research, De-
velopment and Innovation Framework (R&D&I) is
an example of this approach (for example, it delin-
eates four market failures relevant for R&D&I aid –
externalities/knowledge spillovers; public goods/
knowledge spillovers; asymmetric information and
coordination failures – and asks whether the aid
changes the behaviour of the firm).
This approach seems to be consistent with forbidding
state aid which does not respond to a market failure
or common interest objective, even though the aid
may neither distort trade nor competition across bor-
ders. This implies a paternalistic approach from the
Commission towards member states and seems at
odds with the provisions of Article 87 of the Treaty
and some case law from the European Court of First
Instance (such as Philip Morris 1980, Le Levant 2006,
Wam 2006).45
The big issue, obviously, is whether the Commission
should be paternalistic in the way that it oversees the
policies of the member states – even if they do not
distort trade or competition in the EU. A potential
benefit of a paternalistic approach is the commit-
ment provided by the EU in helping to alleviate
political economy problems and dynamic inconsis-
tency in the decisions at the national level. Indeed,
there is some evidence that the allocation of aid at
the national level has been determined more by polit-
ical than by economic factors.46 The control of state
aid by the EU has been seen as a way for national
governments to resist the pressures of lobbies and
political biases and to commit to sound policies.47
The question is whether the EC can and should con-
tinue to play this role. The “blame Brussels game”
may not last forever. And control at the EU level,
which does not respond to cross-border externalities,
may be eventually a victim of powerful national and
big firm lobbies.48
The present evolution of state aid control seems to
stand in contradiction to the lack of advance in
political integration. In the foreseeable future it is
not likely that states will relinquish more national
sovereignty. If so, then it would be better to stick to
state aid control purely based on limiting negative
cross-country externalities and interventions to shift
rents across boundaries. The present, more ambi-
tious approach may not be sustainable and may
backfire since it is not backed up by a sufficient
degree of political integration.
6. Conclusions
The first challenge of industrial policy in the EU is to
foster the competitiveness of its companies and the
productivity of the economy. From the analysis set
out in the chapter, certain principles and general con-
siderations on industrial policy can be derived.
1. There are several arguments which in principle
favour an active sector-based industrial policy:
to provide suitable incentives for companies to
enter and exit the market, to help to achieve a
strategic edge in the international market, to
assist in efficient (and fair) restructuring of
declining industries, to leverage positive external
effects, to address issues in coordinating invest-
ment, and to alleviate imperfections in the capi-
tal market.
2. However, any intervention gives rise to side effects
that can make it undesirable. Thus, sector-based
44 See Kroes (2005) and Friedeiszick and Röller (2007).
45 See Spector (2007).
46 Neven and Röller (2000).
47 See Dewatripont and Seabright (2006), and Besley and Seabright
(1999)).
48 This discussion mirrors that of whether fiscal rules at the EU level
can offset “political distortions” at the national level. These issues
have been discussed in the 2003, 2006 and 2007 EEAG reports. See
also Calmfors (2005).intervention requires highly detailed information
on the industry, can trigger strategic behaviour
from rival countries with potential spiralling trade
reprisals, can be captured by specific interests
against the general interest, can restrict competi-
tion, damage production efficiency, and is costly to
the public purse over and above nominal cost, due
to the distortionary taxation needed to finance
state aid.
3. Therefore sector-based intervention must be stud-
ied very carefully. International evidence and expe-
rience as well as theoretical studies suggest that
any intervention, and in particular protection of
productive sectors, (a) must be limited in time with
credible and irrevocable commitments, and (b)
must maintain a healthy level of competition
between companies. In this way, the potential neg-
ative consequences of intervention are minimised.
These observations particularly apply to declining
industries where established interests tend to pro-
long protection well beyond what is required in
terms of efficiency and fairness.
4. Horizontal policies, not targeted to any specific
sectors, have gained increasing prominence.
Promotion of R&D activities, training of human
capital, promotion of internationalisation (brand
image, sales networks, etc.), aid for SMEs are
important factors in any policy that seek to pro-
mote competitiveness and productivity growth.
European countries still allocate an important
(though shrinking) portion of their spending to
sector-based policies. Sector-based aid is mainly
for failing or restructuring industries (steel, ship-
building, coal).
5. Horizontal policies to lower the cost of doing
business and encourage competition have an
important impact on the competitiveness of com-
panies and the productivity of the economy. A
microeconomic framework that maintains an effi-
cient functioning of markets is crucial, and in par-
ticular a light but appropriate regulation and an
active antitrust policy. This factor is particularly
important in many EU countries where restrictive
practices and lack of competition have been the
norm in many sectors.
6. Industrial policy is naturally interwoven with local
and regional policy. With growing international
competition, a regional policy to promote infra-
structure (in a broad sense including human capi-
tal and the science and technology base) and to
strengthen external effects of geographical group-
ings of companies should be allowed under the
general competition and state aid rules of the EU.
7. Regional governments should be allowed to
develop their own industrial policy, if necessary
competing with other regions. The role of the EU
should be to provide a common industrial policy
in European-wide issues and a framework of
common rules to internalise externalities and
limit rent-shifting incentives. By contrast, nation-
al governments should engage much less in indus-
trial policy. Instead, the regions, on the one hand,
and the EU, on the other, are in the better posi-
tion to design policy measures to confront glob-
alisation.
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